3,033 stores. During 2025 the group opened 345 new locations. The 2026 plan calls for openings a few percent above the 2025 level.

In 2025 DINO generated PLN 33.63 billion in revenue (+14.9% YoY), PLN 2.55 billion EBITDA (+9.9%) and PLN 1.56 billion in net profit (+3.5%). EBITDA margin slipped from 7.9% to 7.6% on cost pressure.

EBITDA margin slipped from 7.9% to 7.6%. The company cited higher operating costs — especially wage costs — and an environment of cautious, price-sensitive customers with heavier promotional intensity.

Tomasz Biernacki — DINO's founder — together with a controlled entity holds 51.16% of shares and votes as of end-2025 and the annual report date. Other shareholders hold 48.84%. Biernacki also serves as Chair of the Supervisory Board.

No. Over the past five financial years the General Meeting has decided not to pay a dividend and to allocate profit to network development. The policy is not a permanent commitment — the Board notes future decisions will consider expansion plans, business prospects, cash needs, financial position and legal requirements.

Agro-Rydzyna is the group's meat business. It supplies meat and cold cuts to DINO stores, supporting the fresh-food offer and staffed meat counters. In 2025 Agro-Rydzyna products represented 14.8% of consolidated group revenue.

Top risks: price competition (Biedronka, Lidl, Aldi), cost pressure (wages, retail tax, energy), execution of the expansion plan, cannibalisation in mature regions, consumer price sensitivity, capex intensity and shareholder-control concentration.

Yes. The Polish retail-sales tax hits DINO directly. Any rate or threshold change affects margin. It is a structural cost that DINO can only address through operating efficiency and scale.

Board commentary points to continued dynamic expansion — openings a few percent above the 345 stores opened in 2025 (i.e. around 360–370). The company also targets LFL above the 2025 level of 4.4%, an ambitious goal given the cautious consumer and promotional intensity.

Yes — in proximity but with different geographies. Biedronka has ~3,600+ stores spread across Poland, with strong presence in mid-sized and larger cities. DINO concentrates on smaller towns and villages. Direct competition occurs where the networks overlap geographically — mainly smaller cities. Biedronka has greater scale and brand; DINO has a format tuned to its segment.

DINO develops private labels, but their position is weaker than Biedronka's or Lidl's, which run extensive premium and basic private-label portfolios. Expanding private labels — especially in fresh categories — is a structural opportunity to improve margin.

Full vertical integration with Agro-Rydzyna, proximity format suited to smaller towns, ~41% fresh-product share, organic growth pace (+345 stores per year), negative net debt, experienced management, stable founder shareholder, ~117 MW of photovoltaics lowering energy cost.

LFL (like-for-like) is sales growth from stores open at least a year — i.e. growth from the existing base, excluding new openings. DINO's LFL grew 4.4% in 2025. Investors watch LFL as a clean indicator of customer-demand momentum — more important than total revenue growth, which includes the impact of openings.

Yes. At end-2025 DINO had ~2.9k photovoltaic installations totalling ~117 MW on store and distribution-centre roofs. This lowers the energy bill and reduces exposure to market electricity prices. Renewable-energy investment is part of the ESG strategy and cost discipline alike.

2026 opening pace (target: ~360–370 stores), LFL momentum (will it hold above 4.4%?), EBITDA margin (will the slide from 7.6% stop?), fresh-product share (will it rise above 41%?), capex per new store, photovoltaic progress, any signals on dividends and competitive responses from Biedronka, Lidl and Aldi.

Three variables explain most of DINO's mid-term price moves. First, LFL sales momentum — the clean indicator of whether customers buy more in existing stores or DINO must rely on new openings. Second, EBITDA margin — the slide from 7.9% to 7.6% in 2025 compressed the valuation multiple; any sign of margin stabilisation lifts attractiveness. Third, the store-opening pace — DINO is a growth story. Any slowdown (below 300 stores a year) or quality problem with locations compresses the multiple. Secondary but material drivers: the Polish retail tax, Biedronka's pricing policy, wage costs, FX rates (limited but present on non-fresh imports) and a potential dividend-policy shift. An analyst's first glance is at LFL and EBITDA margin — these two shape most of DINO's valuation.